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Section 1: Introduction 
There is no shortage of proposals to reform the income tax 
and social welfare systems. Reports by the Commission on 
Taxation (1982), the Commission on Social Welfare <1986), the 
National Economic and Social Council (1986), and plans put 
forward by several political parties have produced a range of 
alternative proposals. While the aggregate costs of these 
reforms have been costed, to varying degrees of accuracy, 
very little information is available on the distributional 
implications i.e. the question of who gains and who loses 
from the particular reform. 
There is a similar dearth of information on who gains and who 
loses from more limited income tax and social welfare 
changes, of the type introduced in a typical Budget. At 
best, the effects are assessed by reference to illustrative 
calculations for a small number of family types e.g., a 
married couple with one spouse working, taxed under PAYE. 
Because of the great diversity of families' circumstances, 
and the complex ways in which these circumstances affect 
income tax liabilities and social welfare entitlements, these 
illustrative calculations can be quite misleading as to the 
actual effects even on the groups they are intended to 
represent. They are even less reliable as a guide to the 
actual effects on the general population, since the relative 
importance of the different types is not always known. 
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Partly as a result of these problems, there has been an 
international trend towards the analysis of the effects of 
tax and social security reforms on a large representative 
sample of actual families, instead of a set of hypothetical 
examples. In this paper we outline the steps we have taken 
to provide a similar form of analysis for Ireland. We use 
some preliminary results to illustrate the advantages and 
potential of our methods, which represent a major step 
forward in evaluating proposals for p~licy changes. Until 
now, it has often been difficult to establish the effects of 
policy changes even after they have been introduced. 
Development of the model described and used in this paper 
will allow us to assess the likely impact of reforms before 
they are put into place, and will therefore allow the design 
of policy to be improved. 
We begin by setting out in more detail the need for analysis 
of tax and transfer systems based on representative samples 
rather than hypothetical examples. In Section 3, we outline 
the relevant features of the ESRI Survey of Income 
Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services, which 
provides the detailed information on incomes and family 
characteristics on which our analysis is based. Section 4 
describes how the present or reformed rules of the income tax 
and social welfare systems are applied on a case by case 
basis, in order to find the net effects on each family in the 
sample i.e., the "model" of the tax/transfer system's rules 
which is applied to the data-base in order to calculate the 
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effects on each family. Section 5 shows how the model can be 
used to analyse the effects of incremental policy changes, 
using the 1988 Budget as an example. Section 6 examines a 
policy package consisting of an increase in Child Benefit 
<Children's Allowance) financed by making it taxable: this 
illustrates the scope of the model to examine the effects of 
broader policy reforms, including those which involve an 
interaction between the social welfare and income tax 
<ystems. Section 7 sketches possible future developments and 
applications of the tax-transfer model, while Section 8 draws 
together the main conclusions. 
Section 2: Analysing Income Tax and Social Welfare Changes: 
The Need for a Representative Sample 
The limitations of the use of hypothetical examples to 
examine the effects of changes in tax/transfer policies can 
perhaps best be illustrated in the UK context. There, the 
DHSS has made a systematic attempt to illustrate the effects 
of tax and benefit changes on eight different family types 
(single person with 0/1/2 children, and married couple with 
0/1/2/3/4 children). In order to keep this number of 
·typical· family types to a manageable number, several 
simplifying assumptions had to be made. 
of these were 
The most important 
Cal the family head is the only earner 
(b) there is only one family in the household 
C i.e., al 1 children are dependents, and 
there are none of working age, nor are 
there other relatives or household 
members) 
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<c) the family lives in a council house 
paying average rent and rates 
(d) personal allowances are the only income 
tax allowances 
(e) the family has no unearned income 
In the actual population, two-earner couples, multiple 
tax-unit households <e.g., nuclear families with children of 
working age), owner occupation, special tax allowances, and 
unearned income are very important. Even family composition 
itself shows wider diversity. The net result is, as shown by 
Atkinson and Sutherland (1983) that the ntypicaln households 
in the DHSS tables represent only 4 per cent of actual 
households in the Family Expenditure Survey. Obviously the 
number of family types could be expanded, but even then, the 
analysis of a set of hypothetical examples could not answer 
many of the important questions which arise when considering 
policy changes, such as the aggregate cost of the change, its 
impact on the groups actually at the bottom/top of the income 
distribution, the variation in impact within these groups, 
and so on. 
Modelling the effects of tax/transfer policy changes on a 
random sample of actual households allows one to generate 
results which are representative of the population and allow 
one to answer these key questions on the cost and 
distributive impact of a policy changes. It is, of course, 
important that the reliability of the survey information 
should be checked against external information, such as 
numbers of recipients of various social welfare schemes, the 
distribution of taxable income and so on. These control 
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totals provide a test of the validity of the survey data, and 
can be used to correct for the under-representation of 
certain groups in the population due to differential 
non-response. This issue is discussed in more detail in the 
Section 3.2 below. 
Section 3: The ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty, 
and Usage of State Services 
3.1 Sample and Information Collected 
The detailed information needed to allow the analysis of 
income tax and social welfare changes was collected by the 
ESRI as part of its project on Income Distribution, Poverty 
and Usage of State Services. The details of the survey have 
been set out elsewhere (Callan et al. 1988): here we 
summarise the main features relevant to the present analysis. 
The main fieldwork for the survey took place between March 
and September of 1987. A response was obtained from around 
3,300 private households, selected at random from the 
Electoral Register using the RANSAM programme (Whelan, 1979). 
A household questionnaire, which took about 30 minutes to 
complete, obtained information on household composition, 
housing tenure and costs, and the usage of health and 
education services by each household member. Each adult 
member of the household <aged 15 or over, and not in 
full-time education) was then interviewed individually, in 
order to obtain the most accurate and reliable information 
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possible on all their income sources <both currently and over 
a 12 month period), and on their current, recent and 
long-term experience of the labour market. These individual 
interviews typically lasted from l to 1 1 /• hours. Where a 
full individual interview could not be completed, for 
whatever reason, an abbreviated questionnaire with key 
information on income and labour force status was obtained. 
Information was gathered on a total of 8,200 adults. 
3.2 Response Rate and Re-Weighting 
The responding households represented 64 per cent of the 
effective sample (i.e. contactable households). While this 
is somewhat lower than for other ESRI surveys <perhaps due 
to the sensitivity of the topics, 
times), it is quite comparable to 
and the longer 
that achieved 
interview 
in the 
Central Statistics Office's 1973 and 1980 Household Budget 
Surveys. These Surveys had response rates of 57 and 56 per 
cent of the effective sample. The higher figure for the ESRI 
Survey reflects the fact that the HBS imposes an even greater 
burden on respondents because of the need to complete a 
two-week expenditure diary, and must exclude households where 
even one member fails to complete this diary; the ESRI survey 
was able to use the abbreviated questionnaires, and some 
income imputations detailed in Callan et al. <1988) in cases 
where not all household members completed a full individual 
interview. 
The responding households were "reweighted" using 
tabulations supplied by the CSO so that they were 
special 
fully 
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representative of the national position as found in the 
Labour Force Survey of 1986 in terms of the following 
characteristics: household size, urban/rural location, age 
and socio-economic group of head of household. Further 
independent checks then confirmed the representativeness of 
the sample in terms of the distribution of households with 
different numbers of members engaged in paid work, or 
unemployed <see Table l of Callan and Nolan, 1988, p. 61). 
The reweighted numbers of recipients of major social welfare 
schemes were 
administrative 
1988, p. 61). 
also found to tie in closely with 
statistics <See Table 6.1, Callan et 
the 
al. , 
These checks indicate the general reliability of the sample. 
Further checks on its representativeness in terms of the the 
income tax base, and of child benefit payments, will be 
reported in the context of model-based calculations in later 
sections. 
3. 3 Concepts Used in the Analysis 
The basic unit in the analysis will be referred to as a "tax 
unit". It corresponds to an individual or married couple, 
together with dependent children, if any. A dependent child 
is defined here as aged below 15 or still in full-time 
education. Thus, the tax unit coincides with the income tax 
unit in Ireland when child tax allowances were still in 
force. Many social welfare schemes still operate at 
approximately this level. Members of the same household who 
belong to different tax units are, in general, assessed quite 
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differently by the social welfare and tax codes. Thus , it is 
the most relevant unit for policy purposes. Approximately 
two-thirds of households in the sample contain just one tax 
unit, but 21 per cent contain two tax units and 13 per cent 
contain three or more. A total of just under 6000 tax units 
in the Survey represents approximately 1.5m tax units in the 
country. 
The Survey provided measures of 
self-employment, private pensions, 
income from employment, 
sick pay, social welfare 
payments, 
that most 
rent, interest and dividends. Here we should note 
income components are measured on the basis of 
amounts currently received. The exceptions would be income 
sources which tend to be more variable, where a longer period 
is used in order to obtain a more reliable estimate of the 
usual income: rent, interest, dividends, self-employment and 
farming income. Information was also collected which would 
allow reliable estimates of employment and social welfare 
income over a 12 month period, and this variable will later 
be used as the more appropriate one for a tax/transfer model. 
The estimation of farm income is described in Callan et al. 
1988. Here it is important to note that the concept of farm 
income used is family farm income as defined by An Foras 
Taluntais's National Farm Survey: this can be significantly 
greater than taxable farm income because of provisions in the 
tax code for capital allowances and stock relief. 
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Section 4: How the Effects of Policy Changes are Calculated 
In this section we describe the current state of the ·model· 
of the income tax and social welfare systems, which is 
applied to the data on each tax unit in order to calculate 
the ·cash· or •first-roundff effects of policy changes. We 
also indicate some of the advantages of this form of policy 
analysis. 
The model allows one to choose a set of policy parameters, 
including income tax and PRSI rates, tax bands, personal and 
other allowances, exemption limits, and the levels of certain 
social welfare payments. Once these policy parameters are 
set (for instance, at their status quo values as of 1987), 
the model takes each family unit in turn, and calculates its 
social welfare receipts and its income tax liabilities, based 
on its 
calculation 
gross income and other circumstances. 
then yields the level of net income for the 
This 
tax 
unit, and the marginal income tax rate it faces. We can then 
repeat the process for some other set of policy parameters 
(for example, those introduced in the 1988 Budget), and 
derive the change in net income and the change in the 
marginal tax rate for each tax unit. The aggregate of the 
changes in net income represents the net cost or revenue from 
the change: a ·revenue neutral· reform would have a zero net 
cost. Other summary statistics based on the gains and losses 
for each tax unit indicate the distributional implications of 
the policy change under consideration. 
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Modelling the operation of the tax/transfer system in this way 
opens up the scope for analysis of considerable richness and 
variety. Among the major advantages of this method of analysis 
are: 
( i ) Policy 
policy 
specified in terms of the 
at the government's disposal, 
e.g., changes in rates of tax or benefit or changes 
in tax-free allowances; 
changes can 
instruments 
be 
Ciil The cash effects of changes on individuals, tax units 
and households can be calculated. These cash effects 
can be used to show how prespecified groups are 
likely to be affected (or to characterise the main 
differences between those who are likely to gain or 
lose large or small amounts); 
(iii) The modelling approach allows the analysis of both 
incremental and more fundamental policy changes; 
<iv) It is easy to compare alternative reforms, as well as 
any given reform and the status quo. 
Concrete illustrations of these advantages are given in the 
following sections. 
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Section 6: Incremental Policy Changes: The 1988 Budget 
The usefulness of the model in analysing the effect of 
budget-style changes in taxation and social welfare payments 
can be illustrated by calculating the individual and combined 
effects of the main changes in 1988. 
The main changes in the structure <rather than the 
administration) of income taxation in the 1988 Budget were a 
small increase in the personal and PAYE allowances, a more 
substantial widening of the 35% income tax band, and a small 
widening of the 48% band; income exemption limits were also 
raised, as were the ceilings for PRSI and health 
contributions. The main changes in social welfare payments 
introduced in the 1988 Budget were a 3% across the board 
increase, roughly in line with consumer price inflation, and 
a special higher increase for those on the lowest rates of 
payment. The personal rate for Unemployment Assistance and 
Supplementary Welfare Assistance was raised by 11%, while the 
child dependant allowance was increased by 6%; the allowance 
for a dependent spouse was simply in line with the general 3% 
increase. This is the set of changes which we consider here; 
we do not include, for instance, the introduction of PRSI for 
the self-employed, which raises issues concerning the stream 
of future benefits to which contributors will become 
entitled. 
Before analysing the model's estimates of the distributive 
implications of these measures, it is important to check that 
13 
the model's estimate of the aggregate amount distributed is 
approximately correct. It is often thought that income 
surveys tend to underestimate total income, and thereby the 
income tax base. In the case of our survey, however, we have 
found a substantial overprediction of the reported income tax 
take for 1987. Identification of the exact factors 
responsible for this, their relative importance, and what 
remedial action (if any) is required by each different causal 
factor will figure high on our agenda for developing the 
model. Here we can only mention some of the factors which 
could contribute to this overprediction of revenue, and point 
out that until it is satistfactorily explained, certain 
aspects of the model results must be treated with caution. 
The amounts of money received under the tax amnesty suggest 
that the eventual tax take for 1987 will be significantly 
above what was originally reported; once this correction 1s 
made to the official figures, no further action will be 
required on this front. We have already noted that the lack 
of adjustment for capital allowances and stock relief may 
have led to overprediction of the tax take from farm income: 
the size of this problem can be identified. Similarly, we 
can calculate how much of the overprediction is due to 
employee and self employed incomes, and narrow down the 
responsible factors. One other factor which may account for 
some overprediction is that investment income was treated as 
taxed at the full marginal rate, while in practice some of 
this income may be taxed only at the standard rate of the 
Deposit Interest Retention Tax. 
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Despite the overprediction of the aggregate level of income 
tax receipts, the model's estimates of the aggregate cost of 
the 1988 Budget's tax measures is, at about £145m very close 
to the £150m estimate of the full year cost given in the 
Minister's Budget Speech. The model underestimates the cost 
of the social welfare increases, at around £80m as against 
the Budget estimate of £100m. These estimates of the 
aggregate cost are however, close enough to the Budget 
estimates to permit some confidence in the analysis of the 
way in which these increases were distributed, 
now turn. 
to which we 
Since the 1988 Budget measures which we are considering did 
not create any losers, we can examine the pattern of 
aggregate and percentage gains across the income distribution 
in the way shown in Table 5.1. We have divided the 
population of tax units into 10 groups or HdecilesH, ranked 
by their net disposable income in 1987, from poorest (bottom 
decile) to richest <top decile). Each decile contains the 
same number of tax units: 10 per cent of the total. The 
income ranking takes account of the different numbers of 
adults and children in different tax units, by counting 1 for 
the first adult, 0.7 for each other adult aged 18 or over, 
and 0.5 for each child in the tax unit. This Hequivalence 
scaleH as it is known, is relatively generous to children. 
The results have also been obtained for a scale less generous 
to children, and closer to that embodied in the current 
social welfare rates of payment: 1 for the first adult, 0.66 
for each other adult, and 0.33 for each child. The 
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equivalence scale adjustment can be thought of as a slight 
generalisation of the idea of using income per person: 
instead, we use income per Hadult equivalentff or Hequivalent 
income". 
Table 5.1 Distribution of Gains from Main Income Tax 
and Social Welfare Measures in 1988 Budget 
by 1987 Net Equivalent Income Decile 
(Equivalence Scale l for the first adult, 
Decile 
Bottom 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
Top 
Total 
0.7 for other adults, and 0.5 per child) 
% Change 
l. 55 
5.59 
3.01 
2.46 
l. 99 
1.78 
1.32 
l. 45 
2.65 
2.68 
2.42 
Aggregate 
Gain 
( £m p.a. I 
4.2 
22.1 
17.3 
13.2 
13.8 
14.6 
14.3 
19.2 
39.5 
66.8 
225.2 
Separate analysis of the tax changes and the special social 
welfare increases helps to explain the net pattern shown 
here. The special Social Welfare increases are concentrated 
particularly in the second decile; the first decile contains 
many tax units which are not in receipt of any social welfare 
payment. The gains from the tax changes, on the other hand, 
' 
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were found to rise with income, with a particular 
concentration in the top two deciles: this reflects the fact 
that top rate taxpayers gain the maximum absolute benefit 
from widening of the 35% rate band (i.e., the amount of the 
band increase times the marginal tax rate) and the heavy 
concentration of top rate taxpayers in the top two deciles. 
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Section 6: Structural Reform: 
An Increased, Taxable Chi 1 d Bene£ it 
Evidence of the financial difficulties facing low income 
families with children (both in and out of work) has prompted 
calls for greater assistance to be directed towards them. 
However, it is not clear that existing policy instruments 
(such as child benefit, child dependant payments, and Family 
Income Supplement) can achieve the desired objectives at an 
acceptable cost, or without undesirable side-effects on 
incentives. For this reason, proposals to reform the Chil9 
Benefit scheme, by increasing the payment and making it 
taxable, have periodically been mooted. Most recently, the 
National Plan, Building on Reality 1984-1987, came down in 
favour of this course of action, while the Commission on 
Social Welfare reports that it did not reach agreement on 
this issue (p. 296). 
McCashin (1988) documents the chequered history of proposals 
of this type. The full cost and distributional implications 
of the National Plan proposal to integrate all forms of child 
income support into a single child benefit payment were not 
explored, and the proposal was not implemented. The 
Commission on Social Welfare's failure to reach agreement on 
this issue may reflect fundamental disagreements on values or 
objectives: but it could, on the other hand, be largely due 
to differences of opinion as to the actual effects of such a 
measure. Here we explore the cost and distributional 
implications of an increase in Child Benefit which is 
financed by making the benefit taxable: our results could 
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help to resolve disagreements which arise from differing 
views on the likely effects of such a measure, rather than 
more fundamental disagreements concerning values and 
objectives. 
The first, and critical, result derived from our analysis is 
the level of increase of Child Benefit which is consistent 
with a zero net cost to the Exchequer. The preliminary 
answer derived from our model is that an increase of around 
40%, or £1.50 per week for each of the first 5 children, and 
around £2 per week for 6th and subsequent children, would be 
revenue neutral·. That is, the 40% increase in gross 
expenditure on child benefit would be offset by an equivalent 
increase in income tax revenue, 
It is important to note the preliminary nature of this 
answer, before proceeding to illustrate the distributional 
analysis which is based on this premise. We have already 
seen that the model appears to overpredict existing income 
tax revenue. Its prediction of expenditure on child benefit 
is much closer to the actual figure: £227m as against £215m. 
The overprediction of the tax base may lead to an upward bias 
in the estimate of the tax revenue from taxing child benefit. 
However, it is not certain that such a bias exists, since the 
previous section has shown that the estimates of the cost of 
Budget changes in tax rates and bands were quite accurate. 
Further work along the lines indicated in that section will 
be necessary to ensure that the model's predictions in this 
area are reliable. In the interim, we report the results 
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without further adjustment, but warning against placing too 
heavy a burden on these preliminary figures: our main concern 
is to illustrate the value of the method, and our evaluation 
of the particular reform must be considered a provisional 
one. 
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of the percentage gains and 
losses under an increased, taxable Child Benefit. 
Table 6.1 Distribution of Gains and Losses (% of Net Income) 
for Increased, Taxable Child Benefit 
Gain(+) or Loss(-) 
% <>/ Net lwl~Me 
<- 5% 
-3% to -5% 
-1% to -3% 
0 to -1% 
No Change 
0 to +1% 
·+1% to +3% 
+3% to +5% 
> +5% 
Revenue 
Neutral 
Reform 
0.0 
0.3 
2.6 
20.0 
66.1 
0.5 
4.1 
3.7 
2.6 
100.0 
Standard 
Rate 
Taxpayers 
Compensated 
7. •I TJx Unit) 
0.0 
0.2 
1.8 
7.1 
79.9 
0.2 
3.5 
3.5 
3.7 
100.0 
The most striking feature of the balance of gains and losses 
under the revenue neutral reform is the large number of tax 
units which would experience small losses, as against a smaller 
number which would experience larger gains (about 10% gaining 
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more than 1%). This picture reflects the fact that the 
increase in Child Benefit of £1.50 per week is just below what 
is required to compensate standard rate taxpayers for making 
the 
week. 
benefit taxable; they lose around 20 pence per child 
A policy change which involved such a large number 
per 
of 
losers might well be deemed either undesirable, or impossible 
to implement. The cost of raising Child Benefit by the full 
amount necessary to compensate. standard rate taxpayers for 
making the benefit taxable is estimated by the model at between 
£15 and £20 million pounds. The distribution of gains and 
losses <second column of table) then shows a more even balance 
between gainers and losers, with the gainers experiencing 
rather larger percentage changes in net income. 
We now turn to the question of where the gainers and losers 
from the original, revenue neutral reform are located in the 
income distribution. Table 6.2 reports the aggregate (or 
mean) percentage gain or loss for each decile of the 
equivalent income distribution, and the aggregate gain or 
loss <in £m per year) for each group. The percentage change 
column shows a progressive pattern in the net income changes: 
gains for the bottom half of the distribution, and losses for 
the top half. The percentage and aggregate gains are largest 
for the bottom three deciles. The aggregate gain and 
aggregate loss columns show that there are no losers in the 
bottom decile and very few in the second; while there are no 
gainers in the top two deciles, and very few in the deciles 
just below that. An alternative equivalence scale, which 
makes a less generous allowance for the needs of children, 
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and is closer to that embodied in the present structure of 
social welfare payments yields a similar pattern of results. 
The main differences are that there are no losers in the 
second decile, and very few in the third, while the aggregate 
gain peaks at the third rather than the second decile. 
Table 6.2 Distribution of Gains and Losses from 
Decile 
Bottom 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
5th 
6th 
7th 
8th 
9th 
Top 
Blackwell 
an Increased, Taxable Child Benefit 
by 1987 Net Equivalent Income Decile 
(Equivalence Scale l for the first adult, 
0.7 for other adults, and 0.5 per child) 
% Change Aggregate Aggregate 
Gain <Cm p.a. l Loss <Cm 
3.18 4.9 0.0 
1.30 10.l 0.5 
0.72 7.2 1.4 
0.20 2.9 1.3 
0.12 2.7 l. 7 
-0.01 1.2 1.6 
-0.10 0.7 2.5 
-0.18 0.1 3.9 
-0.23 0.0 5.5 
-0.21 0.0 7.6 
P.a. l 
<1988) has pointed out that Hthe taxing of Child 
Benefit would bring more low income families into the tax net 
and into the region of the poverty trap .... This effect would 
be magnified, especially for the larger families, if the 
trade-off for the taxing of Child Benefit were to be an 
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increase in rates of Child Benefit". While a full 
examination of the complex of factors discussed by Blackwell 
is outside the scope of this paper, we can examine the 
changes in marginal income tax rates implied by the reform 
under discussion here. This gives some idea of the magnitude 
of the problem identified by Blackwell. 
Table 6.3 Changes in Marginal Income Tax Rates 
Arising From Increased, Taxable Child Benefit 
Change % of Number of 
(in Percentage Points) Tax Units Tax Units 
('OOOs) 
-25 0.5 7 
0 98.0 1,502 
10 0.2 4 
13 0.3 5 
35 0.4 6 
60 0.6 10 
Table 6.3 shows the number and percentage of tax units who 
face unchanged or changed marginal tax rates after the 
reform. While the vast bulk of taxpayers face unchanged 
rates, around .half a percent of tax units are shifted 
upwards between the 35 and 48 or 48 and 58 per cent tax 
rates. Another half a per cent of tax units move from being 
exempt from tax to paying at the standard rate, having moved 
through the marginal relief area. A further 1 per cent of 
tax units are affected by moving in or out of the marginal 
relief area, where a 60% marginal rate applies. Just under 
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half of these move from this 60% into the standard rate area, 
while the remainder move from being exempt from income tax to 
the marginal relief area. 
The marginal rate on incomes just above the exemption limit 
may account for the small number of losers in the lower 
income groups. The aggregate amount of fftax clawbackff from 
this group is, however, fairly small. It would be possible 
therefore, to design a policy change which did not worsen the 
position of this group, or even improved it, at relatively 
low cost. If a policy change of this type was being 
contemplated, it should also take into account the 
interaction with the Family Income Supplement scheme, to 
ensure that income support objectives are achieved without 
worsening the effective marginal tax and benefit withdrawal 
rates facing low income families headed by someone in work. 
An obvious, but important point is that the cash effects of a 
revenue neutral reform must make losers of some people. 
Breaking the constraint of revenue neutrality within the 
personal tax/social welfare area will also typically involve 
indirect costs (such as deferred taxation to service 
borrowing, or effects via the impact on the corporate sector) 
which must be taken into account in assessing the overall 
impact. If, however, a prior decision has been taken which 
allows a net gain for the personal sector, the model allows 
for the examination of policies which allocate that net gain 
in different ways. Thus, the model suggests that if £20m 
were available to spend on the Child Benefit scheme, it would 
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be possible to finance either an increase for all recipients 
of Child Benefit of around 9 per cent, or an increase of over 
50 per cent for those not paying income tax, combined with 
net reductions of between 14 and 35 per cent for higher rate 
taxpayers, and leaving standard rate taxpayers unaffected. 
Section ?: Future Developments 
In the previous two sections we have illustrated the advantages 
of modelling the rules of the income tax and social welfare 
systems, under the status quo and particular reforms, and 
applyi,ng these to predict .the effects of reforms on a sample of 
households and individuals. Such calculations are usually 
referred to as 'cash gain' or 'first-round' effects. A further 
advantage of the modelling approach is that it can go beyond 
this, in attempting to take into account individuals' and 
households' behavioural responses to policy changes. 
Calculations which ignore such responses tend to overestimate 
welfare losses and underestimate gains, relative to 'second 
round' estimates allowing for behavioural reactions. Cash gain 
calculations may therefore have a bias in favour of the status 
quo (see King 1983 for an illustration of the possible extent 
of this bias). The issues concerning behavioural responses can 
also be seen as part of the wider questions of tax incidence. 
In the tax/transfer area, labour supply responses are perhaps 
of the most obvious importance, and efforts have been made to 
incorporate such elements into a micro-data based model of the 
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tax/transfer system. As discussed in Atkinson and Sutherland 
11988) specification of such behavioural elements in a way 
which is both satisfactory from a theoretical point of view and 
suitable for incorporation in a tax/benefit simulation 
model is a complex undertaking. 
has so far been achieved in this 
Only limited progress 
area internationally and 
the estimation of responses on Irish data involves a great 
deal more than simple replication of work done elsewhere. 
Simply modelling· the rules of the Irish income tax and social 
security systems, as they are currently and as they would be 
under various proposed reforms, represents a considerable 
improvement on the analysis currently possible here, and has 
therefore been our immediate goal. 
Our plans for the incorporation of behavioural responses are 
outlined in Callan and Nolan 11987). While developing a 
programme of labour supply research along the lines indicated 
there, we can provide some indication of the effects of policy 
changes on incentives, such as marginal tax rates. Further 
sensitivity analysis, where particular behavioural responses 
are assumed, will also be possible. The question of 
behavioural responses can be seen as part of the wider issues 
concerning tax incidence. 
At present the income tax side of the model is more highly 
developed than the social welfare side. In the next phase 
of development, entitlements to means-tested benefits will be 
calculated on the basis of the appropriate means test and 
qualification conditions le.g, unemployment, illness, old-age 
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etc. ) . This will allow consideration of quite general 
reforms of the social welfare system, and of issues related 
to the non-take-up of means-tested benefits. Within the next 
year we intend to develop the model so that it can cope with 
major reforms, such as the Phase l proposals of the 
Commission on Taxation, negative income tax schemes, and 
other ways of integrating social welfare and taxation. In 
the longer term, we also aim to produce a version of the 
model which could be used by policy makers and other 
interested parties in order to improve the quality of policy 
design. In the UK, the Institute for Fiscal Studies' model 
(Davis, Dilnot, Stark and Webb 1987) and the LSE's TAXMOD 
would be the best known and most highly developed public use 
models of this type. 
Section 8: Conclusions 
There has, up to now, been a distinct shortage of information 
on the pattern of gains and losses arising from actual or 
proposed to the Irish income tax and social welfare systems. 
There are severe difficulties in relying on calculations for 
hypothetical ·typical• families to identify the overall 
picture of gains and losses. A more accurate and reliable 
picture can be obtained by applying the rules of the existing 
and reformed tax/transfer systems on a case-by-case basis, to 
establish the income tax liabilities and social welfare 
entitlements of a nationally representative sample of actual 
families; this is what a ·tax/transfer model" does. The 
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model described in this paper is designed to use the data 
gathered for a nationally representative sample of households 
in the ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage 
of State Services. It allows the cost, revenue and 
distributional implications of a broad range of policy 
changes to be explored in much greater depth than has been 
possible heretofore. 
Two examples of the type of reform which can be analysed by 
the model were given. The first was the set of incremental 
policy changes embodied in the 1988 Budget, including special 
social welfare increases for those on the lowest rates, and 
income tax reductions. The second was a policy package 
consisting of an increase in Child Benefit financed by making 
the benefit taxable; the analysis of this reform illustrated 
the advantages of the model in estimating the net costs of 
proposals which involve an interaction between the income tax 
and social welfare systems. Some indications of the effects 
on marginal tax rates were also given. The results are 
preliminary at this stage, but serve to illustrate the 
potential of this form of analysis. 
Future developments will include an analysis of the cash or 
nfirst-roundn effects of more wide-ranging reforms, such as 
the phase 1 proposals of the Commission on Taxation; 
estimation and incorporation of behavioural responses, 
particularly labour supply responses, to policy changes; and 
the production of a Hpublic-useH version of the model, so 
that policy-makers and other interested parties can assess 
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possible policy changes independently. The extent of this 
ambitious programme for the future should not obscure, 
however, the major steps which have already been taken 
towards putting the evaluation of Irish tax and welfare 
policy changes on a firmer footing. 
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